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Headway Digital Intermediate 4 __TOP__


Some people here have tried vireyas and have been disappointed because they either were ignorant of or did not follow some now well tested guidelines for their culture. We have found that there are really only two critical cultural requirements: use a suitable growing mix which provides excellent drainage and let the growing mix dry out almost completely between watering. I don't know if these requirements are equally critical in cooler growing areas where root rot problems may not be as great a concern, but here it is essentially a lead pipe cinch that any container grown vireya which is not treated in this way will surely die, quickly. Plants growing in the garden beds have proven to be a bit more tolerant of non-optimum dampness conditions. Fortunately, the periods of continued dampness which occur naturally during the winter, even during our wettest winters, have not been found to lead to any significant loss of plants due to root rot. Apparently the warmer temperatures of the spring through early fall period are needed for the root rot organisms to make headway. The growing mix which we have had the most experience with and which has proven to provide the good drainage required is one third coarse peat moss, one third coarse sponge rock (Perlite) and one third small, orchid mix size bark. In the raised garden beds this mix is used undiluted in the top 12to15 inches of the beds. This depth has been very adequate, even for the older, mature plants. For some of the fussier varieties, typically those with less vigorous root systems, we have found it advisable to pay particular attention to maintaining sharp drainage and we replace the mix, both in containers and garden beds, every three to five years. On the other hand, some of the older plants in the garden beds have been growing very happily in their original mix for up to 15 years now. So, periodic replacement of the growing mix is a matter of judgment and how much TLC one is willing to expend in growing these plants.




headway digital intermediate 4



Another group of plants among the 60 have stubbornly clung to a pattern of shorter bloom periods each year. Twelve varieties have limited their bloom to the same months each year for continuous periods of five months or less which, depending on variety, occur throughout the year. Some of these produce quite showy splashes of color sometime during these shorter bloom periods. The plants in this shorter bloom period category are: 'Calavar', 'Ravalac', 'Belisar', 'Cair Paravel', 'Kurt Herbert Adler', R. leucogigas x R. laetum , 'Kurt Herbert Adler' x R. leucogigas (test name 'Santa Lucia'), ('Triumphans' x R. javanicum ) x R. leucogigas , 'Triumphans' x R. zoelleri , 'Pink Creeper' x R. laetum , R. konorii x R. laetum , R. laetum x ( R. konorii x 'Dr. Herman Sleumer') and another R. zoelleri hybrid. The remainder of the 60 plants have bloom patterns intermediate between the two extremes. Figure 1 is a histogram for all 60 varieties. If a given variety has shown color during a given month for any of the four years, it has been included in the total for that month in the histogram.


A regional ban necessarily would consist of two complementary components. The first implements measures to prevent the development of intermediate-range missiles in countries within the region that do not already have them. The second verifiably eliminates current stocks of missiles that exceed the proposed range limit.


Presently, only three countries in the region have the technical wherewithal and industrial capacity to develop intermediate-range missiles. Israel, according to media reports, already fields the medium-range Jericho-2 and possibly the intermediate-range Jericho-3 missiles that are believed to have been manufactured domestically.[2] Iran is actively developing the Sajjil-2, which has a range of 2,000 kilometers.[3] The experience and knowledge accrued in developing the Sajjil-2 provide Iran with the means to build viable, long-range missiles in the future.[4] Turkey could create the capability if it invested the proper money and time into the effort. Egypt, Iraq, and Syria have pursued short-range ballistic missile development programs in the past. Yet, there is no evidence to suggest they seek to create longer-range systems in the near to medium term, nor do any of these countries have the technical capacity to support development of an intermediate-range missile for the foreseeable future. Finally, one country, Saudi Arabia, has purchased intermediate-range missiles from a foreign source, in 1988 when Riyadh imported DF-3 systems from China.[5]


The testing requirement should be exploited to promote a regional flight-test ban on intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The range-payload characteristics of an intermediate-range missile would have to be defined by all of the parties involved in the final agreement, although an envelope of 3,000 kilometers and 500 kilograms seems reasonable.


Space launches, however, cannot be ignored and must be closely monitored by states within the region, as well as outside powers, precisely because they could contribute to a missile development program by offering validation of fundamental concepts, such as those for propulsion systems, stage separation, and testing procedures. Consequently, countries that insist on developing and operating space launchers must conduct these activities with maximum transparency to avoid suspicion. The protocols established under the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation could serve as an initial foundation for promoting transparency and trust among all parties adhering to the regional ban on intermediate-range missiles.


States in the Middle East could go further and establish a monitoring authority to oversee space-related activities within the region and perhaps facilitate reciprocal visits by member states to observe launch activities. To ensure compliance by member states, Russia and the United States could share data from their respective sensor networks with the monitoring authority. Indeed, the monitoring authority could serve as a verification center for the broader ban on intermediate-range flight tests. Participation by Russia and the United States would be key, as they are the only two countries with the suite of space-based sensors and ground-based radars capable of detecting and tracking ballistic missile tests or space launches from the Middle East.


Surprisingly, persuading Israel to relinquish its intermediate-range ballistic missiles might be easier than convincing Saudi Arabia to part with its DF-3s. Israel presently has little strategic imperative for deploying missiles with a range greater than 3,000 kilometers, as the primary threats to the country reside within the Middle East. The whole of Iran, for instance, can be covered by Israeli missiles with a range of 2,800 kilometers. Moreover, Israel maintains a range of delivery options for its strategic payloads and need not rely on ballistic missiles to deter distant rivals.


As explained above, neither Iran nor Israel appears to hold compelling military or strategic imperatives that demand intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The strategic calculus in Riyadh, however, is less clear. Convincing the Saudis to relinquish their DF-3 missiles may prove to be the most difficult challenge to achieving the ban.


Saudi Arabia is rumored to have recently acquired two-stage, solid-propellant DF-21 or Shaheen-2 missiles from China or Pakistan, respectively.[15] The DF-21 and Shaheen-2 missiles are more accurate and reliable than their DF-3 counterparts, they are easier to maintain and operate, and they offer greater mobility, which enhances prelaunch survivability. Upgrading the arsenal with the more modern missiles also bestows greater prestige on Saudi Arabia, although the newer missiles have a reduced range capability. Nonetheless, if the rumors are accurate, it seems reasonable to conclude that Saudi Arabia is in the process of replacing its obsolete DF-3s with 2,000 kilometer-range DF-21 or Shaheen-2 missiles, in which case Riyadh could painlessly decide to scrap the DF-3s altogether, unilaterally or in conjunction with the proposed intermediate-range missile ban.


The international community, perhaps led by China, Russia, the United States, and key member states of the European Union, should seek to persuade countries in the Middle East to negotiate and agree to a verifiable regime that prohibits the possession or flight testing of intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. As outlined above, a combination of incentive packages and diplomatic pressure almost certainly will be required, but the precise nature of the inducements will not become clear until the key parties from the Middle East begin negotiations and define their objectives and concerns.


Promote Greater Engagement by Civil Society. To date, civil society has been much less effective in instigating headway on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation issues than in the sphere of conventional arms such as landmines, small arms and light weapons, and cluster munitions. In principle, however, this need not remain the case, and there is an important role for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to play in conducting research and providing innovative but practical policy recommendations to national governments in the sphere of nuclear-weapon-free zones.


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